Author: Bas Percival, Benjamin Valk, Lucia van Geuns.

In a world where global demand for oil is predicted to outstrip supply, where the pace of reserve replacements is not keeping up with production and cons umption growth, and finds of new oil fields are increasingly rare, the fight is on to secure what’s left. The fact that National Oil Companies (NOCs) now manage roughly 80 percen t of the world's oil supply – compared to the 1970s, when the International Oil Comp anies (IOCs) controlled 85 percent of the world's oil reserves – only makes the competition all the more intense. This has turned the eyes of the Western oil compa nies to the African continent; one of the last arenas in which they can operate wit h relative freedom. With Africa currently producing 12 percent of the world’s oil and ho lding 9.5 percent of the world’s proven recoverable oil reserves, it is little wonder th at there is such heightened interest. However, the Americans, Canadian s and Europeans are not the onl y ones eager to expand their presence in the African oil industry. South Korea, Japan, India, Russia, and, most impressively, China are also out to secure their share. To tal trade between Africa and China amounted to approximat ely $73 billion in 2007, compar ed to a total of $4.8 billion in 1998 (a remarkable 1,277% increase), with oil accoun ting for 80% of this trade, demonstrating just how successful China has been in its endeavour. But not all is as rosy as the trade figures would have one beli eve. Africa is a continent plagued by conflict, making the cost of doing business there on e of the highest in the world. Infrastructure is sorely lacking, as is a reliable, func tioning legal framework in many countries, with the added stress for business that corrupt ion is often endemic and pervasive. Those who are serious about doing business in Africa have to contend with the notion that security cannot be taken for granted and a subs tantial amount of the budget needs to be set aside to this end. Increasing scrutiny b y Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) places an a dditional ‘burden’ on firms ope rating in remote areas. The Chinese, unaccustomed to operating in such an environment, are beginning to face a number of the same hurdles that other foreign oil companies enc ounter in their quest to secure reserves, ranging from “soft” issues such as accusations of environmental damage and support of state terrorism, to outright (terrorist) attacks targeting Chinese firms or citizens. In two particularly bloody attacks, 14 Chinese oil wo rkers were killed (9 in the attack in Ethiopia in April 2007 and 5 in the October 2008 atta ck in Sudan). This paper analyzes energy security through the prism of Sino‐A frican relations, finding 23 cases of direct security incidents involving Chinese oil com panies in Africa since 2005. Chinese firms are learning the hard way that there is a pertinent need to foster sober risk‐assessment and securi ty‐management skills, as nobody – not even the Chinese who bank on their policy of “non‐interference” to creat e goodwill – is immune to security risks.